84.Ibid.p.20.
85.Ibid.p.32.
86.Examination,p.103.
87.'An ultimate end of the natural dialectic,'etc.
88.Discussions,p.14.
89.I may say that although I am an 'Agnostic'I cannot accept Mr Spencer's version of Hamilton's doctrine.But I must not attempt here to estimate the value of Mr Spencer's theory.
90.Reid's Works,p.743n.
91.Lectures,ii.376-413;Discussions,pp.604-28.
92.Letters to Calderwood in Lectures,ii.530-35.
93.One specimen of Hamilton's method may be given for those who care for such things.In the essay on Cousin he opposes 'the Infinite'as the 'unconditionally unlimited'to the 'Absolute'as the 'unconditionally limited'.In both cases we have simple negations of thought,and therefore reach the inconceivable.If Isay a thing and then unsay it,I get simple zero.That is obvious.If,again,the absolute asserts the same limit which is denied by the 'infinite,'they are of course contradictory.And,in this case,we get the old antinomy,which he accordingly introduces in the next sentence about the impossibility of conceiving space either as infinite or finite.But here the contradictory of infinite ought to be --not 'absolute'but 'finite'.Having thus got an 'antimony'by making 'the absolute'equivalent to 'the finite',Hamilton apparently assumes an antinomy between absolute and its contradictory everywhere.But Iam not compelled to think of a thing either as being some quality and so far 'conditioned,'or as being no quality at all.The alternative is either to think of it or not think of it and that leads to no antimony.So again (pp.29,30)infinite time is identified with endless time,and absolute with ended time.
94.Bampton Lectures,(3rd edition,1859),p.71.
95.Lectures,iii.103.
96.Examination,p.105.
97.Bampton Lectures,p.45.
98.Cf.Tennyson's 'Flower in the Crannied Wall'--'.If I could understand What you are,root and all,and all in all,I should know what God and man is.'
99.Bampton Lectures,p.89.
100.Ibid.p.72.
101.Ibid.p.61.
102.Philosophy of the Conditioned,p.51.
103.Bampton Lectures,p.8.
104.Ibid.pp.67,68.
105.Reid's Works,p.974.
106.Bampton Lectures,p.228.Yet he positively asserts (e.g.p.220)that free-will is a 'fact of consciousness.'
107.Ibid.p.217.
108.Ibid.p.121.Though,as he adds,of that alternative which renders that very inconceivability 'itself inexplicable'.
109.Ibid.p.89.
110.Bampton Lectures,p.202.
111.Ibid.p.12.
112.Ibid.p.244.
113.Bampton Lectures,pp.17,18.
114.Ibid.p.212.
115.Examination,p.129.
116.Philosophy of the Unconditioned,p.167(also quoted in Mill's not to above)117.Examination,p.123n.
118.Bampton Lectures,p.234.
119.Ibid.p.239.
120.Philosophy of the Conditioned,p.245.
121.Ibid.p.39n.
122.Examination,pp.170,240;Hamilton's Lectures,i.394.I do not try to reconcile Hamilton's 'Obiter dictum'in this passage with his assertion in his second lecture that 'philosophy'and 'psychology'give the only possible proofs of theology;or with his claim to have met Kant's scepticism.
123.Auguste Comte,(1865)pp.14,15.
124.See Mr John Morley's article in Critical Miscellanies (second edition).
125.Bain's J.S.Mill,p.139.
126.Three Essays,pp.142-54.
127.Three Essays,p.19.
128.Ibid.p.28.
129.Ibid.p.46.
130.Ibid.p.53.
131.Three Essays,p.65.
132.'Why'asks Hume,'is there any misery in the world?Not by chance,surely.From some cause,then?Is it by the intervention of the Deity?but he is perfectly benevolent.Is it contrary to his intentions?But he is Almighty.Epicurus's old questions,'he says,'are yet unanswered.''If,'says Mansel,'an infinitely powerful Being wills evil,he is not perfectly good.If he wills it not,his will is thwarted and his sphere of action limited.'
--Hume's Works (1874),ii.440,442;Bampton Lectures,p.51.
133.Three Essays,p.39.
134.Ibid.p.40.
135.Ibid.p.116.
136.Ibid.p.184.Friday asks Robinson Crusoe why God did not kill the devil.
137.So in the Examination of Hamilton (p.567)he says that this is 'by far the best'and 'by far the most persuasive argument.'
138.Examination,p.246.
139.Three Essays,p.170.
140.The 'ingenious simile,'says Mansel,'by which God is compared to a mechanic fails only in this particular,that both its terms are utterly unlike the objects which they profess to represent.'--Bampton Lectures,p.188.
141.Three Essays,p.174.
142.Three Essays,p.133.
143.Ibid.pp.16,17,Observe the language about 'conforming to the laws of equilibrium among bodies,'instead of 'conforming only to the law of gravitation,'as though we did not necessarily 'conform'to all 'laws of nature'in all cases.
144.Three Essays,p.174.
145.Mill has here come to speak of 'Nature'in the narrower sense,as opposed to art or to nature working through man.
146.Three Essays,p.232.
147.Ibid.p.255.
148.Three Essays,p.76.
149.Ibid.p.100.
150.Ibid.p.82.
151.Three Essays,p.97.
152.Ibid.p.111.
153.Ibid.p.104.
154.Three Essays,p.122.
155.Ibid.p.116.
156.Ibid.pp.248-49.
157.Ibid.p.253.
158.Ibid.p.252.
159.Three Essays,pp.256-57.
160.Ibid.p.216.
161.Bampton Lectures,p.238.
162.Examination of the Reverend F.D.Maurice's 'Strictures'(1859)p.80.This is a reply to Maurice's What is Revelation?(1859).Maurice in a Sequel (1860)answers this and other accusation with dignity;though his remarks upon Mansel were certainly sharp enough.
163.Maurice's most complete book,the Kingdom of Christ (1838,enlarged 1842),is less rhetorical and more logical than its successors.The Theological Essays (1853)gives his teaching in the shortest compass.
164.Mill's Autobiography,p.153.
165.i.e.eine Neigung und Bestimmtheit des Gefuhls,quoted in What is Revelation?p.316.Maurice defends this against Mansel.
166.Begun about 1835for the Encyclopaedia Metropolitana.The whole collected in an edition of 1871-72.
167.Kingdom of Christ (1842)p.253.
