On the 2d and 3d of January the cavalry was engaged in watching the flanks of our position.On the 4th Stanley discovered that the enemy had fled.Collecting his cavalry he moved to the fords of Stone's River, in readiness to cross, and on the 5th, preceding Thomas, they entered Murfreesboro.Zahm's command went out on the Shelbyville pike six miles, meeting with no opposition.Stanley with the rest of his cavalry marched down the Manchester pike, encountering the enemy's cavalry strongly posted at Lytle's Creek in heavy force.Fighting here until sundown, the rebels were driven from one cedar-brake to another until Spear's brigade came up, when they were driven from their last stand in disorder.The cavalry returned and camped at Lytle's Creek to recuperate, after nine days of active campaigning.During this time the saddles were only taken off the horses to groom them, and were immediately replaced.
Bragg in his retreat left in his hospitals all his wounded in Murfreesboro.By this some 2,500 prisoners fell into our hands to be cared for.
Thus, after seven days' battle, the Army of the Cumberland rested in Murfreesboro having achieved the object of the winter campaign.
The final battle for Kentucky had been fought by Bragg and lost.
Nashville, too, was now beyond his hopes, and for the great victory of the 31st, which he claimed, Bragg had but little to show.
In the heavy skirmishing prior to the 31st, success attended every movement of the Federal army.The heavy fighting of the early part of the 31st was all in Bragg's favor up to the time his advance was checked by our centre and the new line on the right.From that time to the occupation of Murfreesboro every movement resulted in favor of the army under Rosecrans, and the retreat of Bragg after the defeat of Breckinridge gave the halo of victory to our army as the result of the campaign.In his retreat Bragg admitted that he had gained nothing but a victory barren of results, at the cost of him of 10,125 killed, wounded, and missing, 9,000 of whom were killed and wounded, over twenty per cent of his command.Bragg's field return of December 10, 1862, shows an effective total of 51,036, composed of 39,304 infantry, 10,070 cavalry, and 1,662 artillery.
By reason of Morgan and Forrest being absent on their raids, Bragg's cavalry was reduced to 5,638.This gave an effective force of 46,604, which was the strength of the army with which Bragg fought the battle.
Rosecrans's force on the battle-field was: Infantry, 37,977;artillery, 2,223; cavalry, 3,200; total, 43,400.His loss was:
killed, 1,553; wounded, 7,245.The enemy captured about 2,800 men.
Making his total loss about twenty-five per cent.of his force in action.Rosecrans lost twenty-eight pieces of artillery and a large portion of his wagon train.Bragg lost three pieces of artillery.
Why did Rosecrans's plan of battle miscarry so fatally and Bragg's come so near absolute success? The fault was not the plan as conceived by the former.The near success of the latter proved a vindication of that.The originator of the plan was not at fault personally, for at no time during the battle did he falter or prove unequal to his command.When called on to give up his plan of the offensive and assume the defensive to save his army, the wonderful power of Rosecrans as a general over troops was never displayed to a greater advantage.With the blood from a slight wound on his cheek, in a light blue army overcoat, through the mud and rain of the battle-field, he rode along the line inspiring his troops with the confidence he felt as to the final result.To Rosecrans there was but one outcome to the battle at Stone's River, and that was victory.When some of his general officers advised retreat to Nashville, not for an instant did he falter in his determination to "fight or die right here." The demoralization of one of his division commanders was so great, that on Thursday afternoon, when the rebels were massing on Rosecrans's right, this general, commanding a division, announced to his brigade commanders that in the event of the anticipated assault resulting disastrously, he proposed to take his division and cut his way through to Nashville.To his troops--the greater part of whom had never seen Rosecrans under the enemy's fire--when on the return from the cedars, they formed anew in front of the Nashville pike--seeing the Commanding General of the army riding fearlessly on the extreme front, in the heat of battle, cool and collected, giving orders and encouraging his men--his mere presence was an inspiration.His personal bravery was never more fully shown than when he rode down to the "Round Forest" with his staff, under fire, at the time Garesche was killed by a shell that only missed the chief by a few inches.In this ride Rosecrans had three mounted orderlies shot dead while following him.When the entire extent of McCook's disaster in its crushing force was revealed to him, he felt the full burden of his responsibility, and rising to the demands of the hour he was superb.Dashing from one point to another, quick to discern danger and ready to meet it, shrinking from no personal exposure, dispatching his staff on the gallop, hurrying troops into position, massing the artillery and forming his new lines on grounds of his own choosing, confident of ultimate success, and showing his troops that he had all confidence in them, it was worth months of ordinary life-time to have been with Rosecrans when by his own unconquered spirit he plucked victory from defeat and glory from disaster.
