Even before the inauguration,he had broached this idea to Lincoln.He had tried to keep Lincoln from inserting in the inaugural the words,"The power confided to me will be used to hold,occupy and possess the property and places belonging to the government."He had proposed instead,"The power confided in me shall be used indeed with efficacy,but also with discretion,in every case and exigency,according to the circumstances actually existing,and with a view and a hope of a peaceful solution of the national troubles,and the restoration of fraternal sympathies and affections."[6]With the rejection of Seward's proffered revision,a difference between them in policy began to develop.Lincoln,says one of his secretaries,accepted Seward's main purpose but did not share his "optimism."[7]It would be truer to say that in this stage of his development,he was lacking in audacity.In his eager search for advice,he had to strike a balance between the daring Seward who at this moment built entirely on his own power of political devination,and the cautious remainder of the Cabinet who had their ears to the ground trying their best to catch the note of authority in the rumblings of vox populi.
For his own part,Lincoln began with two resolves:to go very cautiously,--and not give something for nothing.Far from him,as yet,was that plunging mood which in Seward pushed audacity to the verge of a gamble.However,just previous to the inauguration,he took a cautious step in Seward's direction.
Virginia,like all the other States of the upper South,was torn by the question which side to take.There was a "Union"party in Virginia,and a "Secession"party.A committee of leading Unionists conferred with Lincoln.They saw the immediate problem very much as Seward did.They believed that if time were allowed,the crisis could be tided over and the Union restored;but the first breath of war would wreck their hopes.The condition of bringing about an adjustment was the evacuation of Sumter.Lincoln told them that if Virginia could be kept in the Union by the evacuation of Sumter,he would not hesitate to recall the garrison.[8]A few days later,despite what he had said in the inaugural,he repeated this offer.Aconvention was then sitting at Richmond in debate upon the relations of Virginia to the Union.If it would drop the matter and dissolve--so Lincoln told another committee--he would evacuate Sumter and trust the recovery of the lower South to negotiation.[9]No results,so far as is known,came of either of those offers.
During the first half of March,the Washington government marked time.The office-seekers continued to besiege the President.South Carolina continued to clamor for possession of Sumter.The Confederacy sent commissioners to Washington whom Lincoln refused to recognize.The Virginia Convention swayed this way and that.
Seward went serenely about his business,confident that everything was certain to come his way soon or late.He went so far as to advise an intermediary to tell the Confederate Commissioners that all they had to do to get possession of Sumter was to wait.The rest of the Cabinet pressed their ears more tightly than ever to the ground.The rumblings of vox populi were hard to interpret.The North appeared to be in two minds.This was revealed the day following the inauguration,when a Republican Club in New York held a high debate upon the condition of the country.One faction wanted Lincoln to declare for a war-policy;another wished the Club to content itself with a vote of confidence in the Administration.Each faction put its views into a resolution and as a happy device for maintaining harmony,both resolutions were passed.[10]The fragmentary,miscellaneous evidence of newspapers,political meetings,the talk of leaders,local elections,formed a confused clamor which each listener interpreted according to his predisposition.The members of the Cabinet in their relative isolation at Washington found it exceedingly difficult to make up their minds what the people were really saying.Of but one thing they were certain,and that was that they represented a minority party.Before committing themselves any way,it was life and death to know what portion of the North would stand by them.[11]
At this point began a perplexity that was to torment the President almost to the verge of distraction.How far could he trust his military advisers?Old General Scott was at the head of the army.He had once been a striking,if not a great figure.Should his military advice be accepted as final?
Scott informed Lincoln that Sumter was short of food and that any attempt to relieve it would call for a much larger force than the government could muster.Scott urged him to withdraw the garrison.Lincoln submitted the matter to the Cabinet.He asked for their opinions in writing.[12]Five advised taking Scott at his word and giving up all thought of relieving Sumter.There were two dissenters.The Secretary of the Treasury,Salmon Portland Chase,struck the key-note of his later political career by an elaborate argument on expediency.
If relieving Sumter would lead to civil war,Chase was not in favor of relief;but on the whole he did not think that civil war would result,and therefore,on the whole,he favored a relief expedition.One member of the Cabinet,Montgomery Blair,the Postmaster General,an impetuous,fierce man,was vehement for relief at all costs.Lincoln wanted to agree with Chase and Blair.He reasoned that if the fort was given up,the necessity under which it was done would not be fully understood;that by many it would be construed as part of a voluntary policy,that at home it would discourage the friends of the Union,embolden its adversaries,and go far to insure to the matter a recognition abroad.
