The members of a temporal series ab c d e f, can all be immediately presented as a single whole, when the series has reached just as well as if they were a series of points in space. In the latter case, however, they would, on ac- [p. 154] count of original ocular reflexes, be arranged in relation to the point of fixation, and this fixation-point could, at different times, be any one of the impressions a to f . In time-ideas, on the other hand, it is always the impression of the present moment in relation to which all the rest are arranged in time. When a new impression becomes, in a similar manner, the present impression, even though its sensational contents axe exactly the same as that of the earlier, still, it will be apprehended as subjectively different, for though the affective state accompanying a sensation may, indeed, be related to the feelings of another moment, the two can never be identical. Suppose, for example, that following the series a b c d e f, there is a second series of impressions, a' b' c' d' e' f' in which a' = a, b' = b, c' = c, etc., so far as their sensatiolial elements are concerned. Let us represent the accompanying feelings by a b g d e j and a ' b ' g ' d ' e ' j ' Then a and a ', b and b ', g and g ', ect., will be similar feelings, because the sensations are the same; but they will not be identical, because every affective element depends not, only upon the sensation with which it is immediately connected but also upon the state of the subject as by the totality of its experiences. The state of the subject is different for each of the members of the series a' b' c' d'. . ., from what it was for the corresponding member of the series a b c d because when the impression a' arrives, a has been present, and so a' can be referred back to a, while no such thing was possible in the case of a . Analogous differences in the affective states show themselves in composite series when repeated.
These states are never identical, however much the subjective conditions of the momentarily present feelings may agree, for every one of them has its characteristic relation to the totality of psychical processes. If we assume, for example, a succession of a number of similar series [p.
155] a b c d, a' b' c' d', a" b" c" d", etc., in which a equals a' and a", b equals b' and b", etc., so far as their sensational contents are concerned, still, a" differs from a' in its affective conditions, for a' can be referred back only to a, while a" can be referred back to both a' and a . Besides this, it is true that other differences between impressions like in themselves always,trise from some chance accompanying sensations which influence the affective state.
11. Since every element of a temporal idea is arranged in relation to the impression immediately present, as above remarked, it follows that this present impression will have one of the attributes of the fixation-point in spacial compounds. It will be more clearly and distinctly perceived than other elements of the same idea. But there is a great difference in the fact that this most distinct perception is not connected, as in the case of spacial ideas, with the physiological organization of the sense-organ, but is due entirely to the general attributes of the ideating subject, as expressed in the affective processes. The momentary feeling accompanying the immediately present impression is what helps to its clearest apprehension. We may, accordingly, call the part of a temporal idea which forms the immediate impression the fixation-point of the idea or in general, since it does not depend on external structure, as does the fixation-point of spacial ideas, we may call it figuratively the inner fixation-point. The inner fixation-point is, then, that part of a temporal idea which corresponds to the most clearly ideated and the immediately present impression.
The impressions that lie outside this point of fixation, that is, impressions that have preceded the present, are directly perceived. They are arranged in a regular gradation of diminishing degrees of clearness, from the fixation-point.
A unitary temporal idea is possible only so long as the degree of clear-[p. 156] ness for each of its elements has some positive value. When the clearness of any element sinks to zero, the idea divides into its components.
