The Siege of Chattanooga.
On taking position at Chattanooga, after the battle, the Army of the Cumberland, between the rebel troops in front and the forces of Nature in the rear, was practically in a state of siege.The lines around the town were held by our troops behind extensive rifle-pits, strengthened with heavy earthworks covering all approaches on the front.Bragg's army moved up immediately, and invested our lines, throwing up rifle-pits within a short distance of those of our army.To the rear of these Bragg threw up two other lines of intrenchments and on the right of his command erected a more permanent line of earthworks on the crest of Missionary Ridge, massing however, the bulk of his troops in Chattanooga Valley on our immediate front.As our army retired within its works at Chattanooga, the troops holding the road over Lookout Mountain were withdrawn, and this point was immediately occupied by the enemy and strengthened by extensive works, Bragg sending Longstreet's corps into Lookout Valley to occupy the extreme left of the besieging line, and to cut off all communication with Bridgeport, on the south bank of the Tennessee River.The lines were now fully occupied from the river on the north to the bank south of the town, and the rebel army in force on our front.To the rear the only road that was open was over Walling's Ridge, through Sequatchie Valley, down to Bridgeport, a distance of sixty miles; the short road on the north side down to Bridgeport being closed by the rebel batteries and sharp-shooters, while their troops holding the road to the south of the river compelled all supplies of every kind to be hauled over these sixty miles of road.To thus supply the army during good weather was a very great undertaking, even with the teams of the various commands in good condition, but with the rainy season that soon set in, and the incessant hauling wearing out the mules, the daily rations for the army were constantly growing less and less.
On October 1st, Wheeler crossing the Tennessee with Martin's and Wharton's divisions of cavalry moved up the Sequatchie Valley upon our line of supplies at Anderson cross-roads.Here he captured a large number of trains loaded with rations for the front, burned over three hundred wagons, and killed a large number of animals.
Colonel E.M.McCook with his cavalry division, moving rapidly from Bridgeport, overtook Wheeler on the 2d, and drove him with great loss in a sabre charge from the trains, recapturing some eight hundred mules.After this Wheeler was driven from Shelbyville on the 6th by Mitchell's cavalry, and on the 8th from Farmington by Crook, and from here he re-crossed the Tennessee with a small portion of his command, the rest having been killed or captured.
This loss in wagons, with the roads becoming almost impassable by reason of the heavy rains and the growing weakness of the animals, lessened daily the amount of supplies brought into the town, so that our troops were suffering for food and were in danger of being starved out of Chattanooga.This was what Bragg was quietly waiting for.To supply an army some forty thousand strong, by wagon transportation over rough mountain roads a distance of sixty miles, Bragg knew was an impossibility, and that unless other lines were opened up, the evacuation of the place was only a question of time, and he could then walk in and take undisturbed possession.
As the forage became reduced, the artillery horses, for which there was no immediate need, had their rations cut off, and they died in large numbers, starved to death.The supplies grew so small that parts of crackers and corn dropped in handling packages were eagerly seized and eaten to stay the demands of hunger, and still the pressure was growing daily, and no one knew how it would ultimately end.
However, not for an instant was the idea entertained of abandoning the town, to say nothing of the extreme hazard of attempting that, in the face of the strong force of the enemy on our front.The Army of the Cumberland had won Chattanooga and there they proposed remaining.
Immediately after the battle of Chickamauga, the authorities at Washington sent hurried orders to Burnside, Hurlbut, and Sherman to move forward without delay to Rosecrans's assistance, and on September 24th the latter was informed that "Hooker, with some fifteen thousand men," was en route from the East as fast as rails could take him, and that he would be in Nashville in about seven days.While reinforcements were the thing needed before the battle, now the pressing demand of the hour was the opening of the line of communication to the rear, over which adequate supplies could be forwarded to the troops at the front.To add to the number of men there simply increased the difficulties of the situation.
On the arrival of Hooker with the Eleventh and Twelfth Army Corps at Nashville, Rosecrans directed him to take position on the line of the Chattanooga Railroad, securing that road from the attacks of the rebel cavalry while supplies were being accumulated at Stevenson awaiting the opening of communication with the army at Chattanooga.Without driving back the entire of Bragg's army in Lookout and Chattanooga Valleys, it was impossible to use the railroad from Bridgeport east in bringing up supplies.The wagon-trains could no longer be depended on, and, under the spur of necessity, Rosecrans was preparing a plan to utilize the river with boats.
