He even complained of it in a letter to his wife.The military ritualist would have liked a more Olympian superior.And there is no denying that his head was getting turned.Perhaps he had excuse.The newspapers printed nonsensical editorials praising "the young Napoleon."His mail was filled with letters urging him to carry things with a high hand;disregard,if necessary,the pusillanimous civil government,and boldly "save the country."He had so little humor that he could take this stuff seriously.Among all the foolish letters which the executors of famous men have permitted to see the light of publicity,few outdo a letter of McClellan's in which he confided to his wife that he was willing to become dictator,should that be the only way out,and then,after saving his country,to perish.[3]
In this lordly mood of the melodramatic,he gradually--probably without knowing it--became inattentive to the President.
Lincoln used to go to his house to consult him,generally on foot,clad in very ordinary clothes.He was known to sit in McClellan's library "rather unnoticed"awaiting the General's pleasure.[4]
At last the growing coolness of McClellan went so far that an event occurred which Hay indignantly set down in his diary:"Iwish here to record what I consider a portent of evil to come.
The President,Governor Seward and I went over to McClellan's house tonight.The servant at the door said the General was at the wedding of Colonel Wheaton at General Buell's and would soon return.We went in and after we had waited about an hour,McClellan came in,and without paying particular attention to the porter who told him the President was waiting to see him,went up-stairs,passing the door of the room where the President and the Secretary of State were seated.They waited about half an hour,and sent once more a servant to tell the General they were there;and the answer came that the General had gone to bed.
"I merely record this unparalleled insolence of epaulettes without comment It is the first indication I have yet seen of the threatened supremacy of the military authorities.Coming home,I spoke to the President about the matter,but he seemed not to have noticed it specially,saying it were better at this time not to be making points of etiquette and personal dignity."[5]
Did ever a subordinate,even a general,administer to a superior a more astounding snub?To Lincoln in his selfless temper,it was Only a detail in his problem of getting the army into action.What room for personal affronts however gross in a mood like his?To be sure he ceased going to McClellan's house,and thereafter summoned McClellan to come to him,but no change appeared in the tone of his intercourse with the General."I will hold McClellan's horse,"said he,"if he will win me victories."[6]
All this while,the two were debating plans of campaign and McClellan was revealing-as we now see,though no one saw it at the time-the deep dread of responsibility that was destined to paralyze him as an active general.He was never ready.
Always,there must be more preparation,more men,more this,more that.
In January,1862,Lincoln,grown desperate because of hope deferred,made the first move of a sort that was to be lamentably frequent the next six months.He went over the head of the Commanding General,and,in order to force a result,evoked a power not recognized in the military scheme of things.
By this time the popular adulation of McClellan was giving place to a general imitation of the growling of the Jacobins,now well organized in the terrible Committee and growing each day more and more hostile to the Administration.Lincoln had besought McClellan to take into account the seriousness of this rising tide of opposition.[7]His arguments made no impression.
McClellan would not recognize the political side of war.At last,partly to allay the popular clamor,partly to force McClellan into a corner,Lincoln published to the country a military program.He publicly instructed the Commanding General to put all his forces in movement on all fronts,on Washington's birthday.[8]
From this moment the debate between the President and the General with regard to plans of campaign approached the nature of a dispute.McClellan repeated his demand for more time in which to prepare.He objected to the course of advance which the President wished him to pursue.Lincoln,seeing the situation first of all as a political problem,grounded his thought upon two ideas neither of which was shared by McClellan:the idea that the supreme consideration was the safety of Washington;the resultant idea that McClellan should move directly south,keeping his whole army constantly between Washington and the enemy.McClellan wished to treat Washington as but one important detail in his strategy;he had a grandiose scheme for a wide flanking movement,for taking the bulk of his army by sea to the coast of Virginia,and thus to draw the Confederate army homeward for a duel to the death under the walls of Richmond.Lincoln,neither then nor afterward more than an amateur in strategy,was deeply alarmed by this bold mode of procedure.His political instinct told him that if there was any slip and Washington was taken,even briefly,by the Confederates,the game was up.He was still further alarmed when he found that some of the eider generals held views resembling his own.[9]To his modest,still groping mind,this was a trying situation.In the President lay the ultimate responsibility for every move the army should make.And whose advice should he accept as authoritative?The first time he asked himself that question,such peace of mind as had survived the harassing year 1861left him,not to return for many a day.
At this moment of crises,occurred one of his keenest personal afflictions.His little son Willie sickened and died.
Lincoln's relation to his children was very close,very tender.
