To the right rose Kettle Hill, jutting out and Banking the approach to the main position.Facing it and dismounted were the First and Ninth Regular Cavalry, the latter a negro regiment, and the Rough Riders under Colonel Roosevelt.The Tenth Infantry was between the two wings, and divided in the support of both.Abattery of Gatling guns was placed in position.The Americans steadily advanced in an irregular line, though kept in some sort of formation by their officers.Breaking down brush and barbed wire and sheltering themselves in the high grass, the men on the right wing worked their way up Kettle Hill, but before they reached the rifle pits of the enemy, they saw the Spaniards retreating on the run.The audacity of the Americans at the critical moment had insured the ultimate success of their attack and they found the final capture of the hill easy.
The longer charge against the center of the enemy was in the meantime being pressed home, under the gallant leadership of General Hawkins, who at times was far in advance of his line.The men of the right wing who looked down from their new position on Kettle Hill, a quarter of a mile distant, saw the Spaniards give way and the American center dash forward.In order to support this advance movement, the Gatlings were brought to Kettle Hill, and General S.S.Sumner and Colonel Roosevelt led their men down Kettle and up San Juan Hill, where they swept over the northern jut only a moment after Hawkins had carried the main blockhouse.
The San Juan position now in the hands of the Americans was the key of Santiago, but that entrenched city lay a mile and a quarter distant and had still to be unlocked--a task which presented no little difficulty.The Americans, it is true, had an advantageous position on a hilltop, but the enemy had retired only a quarter of a mile and were supported by the complete system of fortifications which protected Santiago.The American losses totaled fifteen hundred, a number just about made good at this moment by the arrival of General Duffield's brigade, which had followed the main expedition.The number of the Spanish force, which was unknown to the Americans, was increased on the 3d of July by the arrival of a relief expedition under Colonel Escario, with about four thousand men whom the insurgent forces had failed to meet and block, as had been planned.
On the 2d of July there was desultory fighting, and on the 3d, General Shafter telegraphed to the Secretary of War that he was considering the withdrawal of his troops to a strong position, about five miles in the rear.The Secretary immediately replied:
"Of course you can judge the situation better than we can at this end of the line.If, however, you could hold your present position, especially San Juan Heights, the effect upon the country would be much better than falling back."The Spanish commanders, however, did not share General Shafter's view as to the danger involving the Americans.Both Admiral Cervera and General Blanco considered that the joint operations of the American Army and Navy had rendered the reduction of Santiago only a question of time, but they differed as to the course to be pursued.In the end, General Blanco, who was in supreme command, decided, after an exchange of views with the Spanish Government and a consultation with the Captain of the German cruiser Geier, then at Havana, to order the Spanish squadron to attempt an escape from Santiago harbor.Cervera's sailors had hitherto been employed in the defense of the city, but with the arrival of the reinforcements under Escario he found it possible to reman his fleet.An attempt to escape in the dark seemed impossible because of the unremitting glare of the searchlights of the American vessels.Cervera determined upon the desperate expedient of steaming out in broad daylight and making for Cienfuegos.
The blockade systematically planned by Admiral Sampson was conducted with a high degree of efficiency.Each American ship had its definite place and its particular duty.When vessels were obliged to coal at Guantanamo, forty miles distant, the next in line covered the cruising interval.The American combined squadron was about double Cervera's in strength; his ships, however, were supposed to have the advantage in speed, and it was conceivable that, by turning sharply to the one side or the other, they might elude the blockading force.On the very day that Cervera made his desperate dash out of the harbor, as it happened, the New York, Admiral Sampson's flagship, was out of line, taking the Admiral to a conference with General Shafter at Siboney, a few miles to the eastward.The absence of the flagship, however, in no way weakened the blockade, for, if Cervera turned westward he would find the squadron of Schley and the other vessels designated to prevent his escape in that direction, while if he turned eastward he would almost at once be engaged with the New York, which would then be in an advantageous position ahead of the chase.
