The responsibility for this calamity has never been positively determined.It may have resulted from an accidental internal explosion, from the official action of the Spanish authorities, from the unofficial zeal of subordinate Spanish officers, or even--as suggested by Speaker Reed who was an opponent of war--by action of the insurgents themselves with the purpose of embroiling the United States and Spain.The careful investigations which were afterwards made brought to light evidence of both internal and external explosions; it therefore seems probable that an external mine was the prime cause of the disaster and that the internal explosion followed as a consequence.No direct evidence has been discovered which would fix the responsibility for the placing of the mine, but it is reasonable to attribute it to the Spanish hotheads of Havana.It is not impossible that the insurgents were responsible; but it is incredible that the Spanish Government planned the explosion.
The hasty, though perhaps natural, conclusion to which American public sentiment at once leaped, however, was that the disaster was the work of Spain, without making any discrimination between the Government itself and the disaffected factions.A general sorrow and anger throughout the United States reinforced the popular anxiety for national interests and the humane regard for the Cubans.Press and public oratory demanded official action.
"Remember the Maine!" was an admonition which everywhere met the eye and ear.The venerable and trusted Senator Proctor, who visited Cuba, came back with the report that conditions on the island were intolerable.On the 9th of March, "Uncle Joe" Cannon, the watchdog of the Treasury, introduced a bill appropriating fifty million dollars to be used for national defense at the discretion of the President.No doubt remained in the public mind that war would result unless the withdrawal of Spanish authority from Cuba could be arranged peaceably and immediately.
Even in this final stage of the negotiations it is sufficiently obvious that the United States Government was particularly desirous of preserving peace.There is also little doubt that the Spanish Government in good faith had the same desire.The intelligent classes in Spain realized that the days of Spanish rule in Cuba were practically over.The Liberals believed that, under the circumstances, war with the United States would be a misfortune.Many of the Conservatives, however, believed that a war, even if unsuccessful, was the only way of saving the dynasty, and that the dynasty was worth saving.Public opinion in Spain was therefore no less inflamed than in America, but it was less well-informed.Cartoons represented the American hog, which would readily fall before the Spanish rapier accustomed to its nobler adversary the bull.Spanish pride, impervious to facts and statistics, would brook no supine submission on the part of its people to foreign demands.It was a question how far the Spanish Government could bring itself to yield points in season which it fully realized must be yielded in the end.
The negotiation waxed too hot for the aged John Sherman, and was conducted by the Assistant Secretary, William Rufus Day, a close friend of the President, but a man comparatively unknown to the public.When Day officially succeeded Sherman (April 26, 1898) he had to face as fierce a light of publicity as ever beat upon a public man in the United States.Successively in charge of the Cuban negotiations, Secretary of State from April to September, 1898, President of the Paris Peace Commission in October, in December, after a career of prime national importance for nine months in which he had demonstrated his high competence, Day retired to the relative obscurity of the United States circuit bench.Although later raised to the Supreme Court, he has never since been a national figure.As an example of a meteoric career of a man of solid rather than meteoric qualities, his case is unparalleled in American history.
The acting Secretary of State telegraphed the ultimatum of the Government on March 27, 1898, to General Stewart L.Woodford, then Minister to Spain.By the terms of this document, in the first place there was to be an immediate amnesty which would last until the 1st of October and during which Spain would communicate with the insurgents through the President of the United States;in the second place, the reconcentrado policy was to cease immediately, and relief for the suffering Cubans was to be admitted from the United States.Then, if satisfactory terms were not reached by the 1st of October, the President was to be recognized as arbiter between the Spaniards and the insurgents.
