and in practice they were observed as rules.(53)If,on any occasion,it was thought proper to make a shew of proving them,it was rather for form's sake than for any thing else:and that,rather in the way of memento or instruction to acquiescing auditors,than in the way of proof against opponents.On such an occasion the common place retinue of phrases was at hand;Justice,Right Reason required it,the Law of Nature commanded it,and so forth;all which are but so many ways of intimating that a man is firmly persuaded of the truth of this or that moral proposition,though he either thinks he need not,or finds he can't,tell why.Men were too obviously and too generally interested in the observance of these rules to entertain doubts concerning the force of any arguments they saw employed in their supportIt is an old observation how Interest smooths the road to Faith.
39.A compact,then,it was said,was made by the King and People:the terms of it were to this effect.The People,on their part,promised to the King a general obedience.The King,on his part,promised to govern the people in such a particular manner always,as should be subservient to their happiness.I insist not on the words:I undertake only for the sense;as far as an imaginary engagement,so loosely and so variously worded by those who have imagined it,is capable of any decided signification.
Assuming then,as a general rule,that prom ises,when made,ought to be observed;and,as a point of fact,that a promise to this effect in particular had been made by the party in question,men were more ready to deem themselves qualified to judge when it was such a promise was broken,than to decide directly and avowedly on the delicate question,when it was that a King acted so far in opposition to the happiness of his people,that it were better no longer to obey him.
40.It is manifest,on a very little consideration,that nothing was gained by this manoouvre after all:no difficulty removed by it.It was still necessary,and that as much as ever,that the question men studied to avoid should be determined,in order to determine the question they thought to substitute in its room.It was still necessary to determine,whether the King in question had,or had not acted so far in opposition to the happiness of his people,that it were better no longer to obey him;in order to determine,whether the promise he was supposed to have made,had,or had not been broken.For what was the supposed purport of this promise?It was no other than what has just been mentioned.
41.Let it be said,that part at least of this promise was to govern m subservience to Law:that hereby a more precise rule was laid down for his conduct,by means of this supposal of a promise,than that other loose and general rule to govern in subservience to the happiness of his people:
and that,by this means,it is the letter of the Law that forms the tenor of the rule.
Now true it is,that the governing in opposition to Law,is one way of governing in opposition to the happiness of the people:the natural effect of such a contempt of the Law being,if not actually to destroy,at least to threaten with destruction,all those rights and privileges that are founded on it:rights and privileges on the enjoyment of which that happiness depends.But still it is not this that can be safely taken for the entire purport of the promise here in question:and that for several reasons.First,Because the most mischievous,and under certain constitutions the most feasible,method of governing in opposition to the happiness of the people,is,by setting the Law itself in opposition to their happiness.
Secondly,Because it is a case very conceivable,that a King may,to a great degree,impair the happiness of his people without violating the letter of any single Law.Thirdly,Because extraordinary occasions may now and then occur,in which the happiness of the people may be better promoted by acting,for the moment,in opposition to the Law,than in subservience to it.Fourthly,Because it is not any single violation of the Law,as such,that can properly be taken for a breach of his part of the contract,so as to be understood to have released the people from the obligation of performing theirs.For,to quit the fiction,and resume the language of plain truth,it is scarce ever any single violation of the Law that,by being submitted to,can produce so much mischief as shall surpass the probable mischief of resisting it.If every single instance whatever of such a violation were to be deemed an entire dissolution of the contract,a man who reflects at all would scarce find any-where,I believe,under the sun,that Government which he could allow to subsist for twenty years together.It is plain,therefore,that to pass any sound decision upon the question which the inventors of this fiction substituted instead of the true one,the latter was still necessary to be decided.All they gained by their contrivance was,the convenience of deciding it obliquely,as it were,and by a side windthat is,in a crude and hasty way,without any direct and steady examination.
42.But,after all,for what reason is it,that men ought to keep their promises?The moment any intelligible reason is given,it is this:that it is for the advantage of society they should keep them;and if they do not,that,as far as punishment will go,they should be made to keep them.
