A king cannot be tempted to give up the interest of the crown，because he cannot give up this public interest，without giving up his private interest；whereas the members of such assemblies may promote their private interest，by sacrificing to it that of the public.Several other reasons might be insisted upon，to establish the truth of the observation we have made，and to show how unfairly they argue，who all along suppose that the independency of the crown may as easily be lost，and the balance of power be destroyed on that side，by concessions from the prince，and usurpations on him，as the independency of the lords or commons may be lost，and the balance of power be destroyed on that side，by concessions to the prince，and by his usurpations.Such reasons，for instance，might be drawn from the difference of that influence which the crown hath on the other estates，and which the other estates have on the crown；as well as from the difference of the pretences，which may be urged on behalf of the crown，or of the nobility，or commons，to obtain such concessions；for supposing them all co-equal，as parts of the legislature，yet if it be considered that the executive power is solely in the crown；that the disposition of public money，as well as public employments，is a part of this power；that this power is in continual exercise，and may immediately affect，more or less，at one time or at another，every particular man，peer as well as commoner；whereas the other powers are exercised occasionally，are continued or suspended，in great measure，at the will of the prince，and are employed chiefly in matters of general，not particular concern；in fine，if it be considered farther，that the powers exercised by assemblies of peers and commoners，whether these assemblies be regarded as parts of the legislature，as the great councils of the nation，or as the judges and prosecutors of enormous offenders，are few and simple，directed to notorious purposes，conducted by rules always known，always the same，and always sufficient to these purposes：whereas the branches of executive power are numerous and complicated，the rules various，and the purposes often unknown，often contingent；so that it may become difficult to judge either of the utility of the purposes，or of the sufficiency of the powers：if all these things be considered，Isay，we shall not be at a loss to determine on which side the danger to liberty，in a limited monarchy，lies；and whether concessions to the crown，in prejudice of the constitution，are not more likely to be made，than concessions from it.
Happy had it been for the people of Castile，if they had seen this danger in time，and had remedied，whilst the remedies were in their power，those defects in their constitution，whatever they were，which gave their kings by degrees such an influence over the Cortes，as overturned at last the whole constitution，and gained to the German race，that began to reign in Charles the Fifth (for his father Philip is scarce to be reckoned)，such an absolute power as the Gothic kings had never been able to obtain.Though Charles the Fifth was a very able prince，yet the honour，for such it will be esteemed by some men，or more truly the infamy of enslaving Castile，must not be ascribed to his superior capacity，nor to that of his ministers.Had he been the merest tool，a thing of straw，but something less than a scarecrow，and unable to protect the property of his subjects，he might still have taken their liberties from them in that conjuncture，as he did most effectually.Corruption was established；a majority of the Cortes was bribed；the nobility was detached from the common interest by titles，places，pensions，and grants；and the clergy in general，for exceptions there were，took no farther share in it than their particular piques，or some indirect and fleeting considerations inspired them to take.The nation saw itself betrayed，and the commons protested loudly against the proceedings of their representatives.But this was the very point for which the enemies of the Castilian constitution waited；and as soon as a pretence for employing force was given them，they muffled themselves up in that threadbare cloak of zeal for the government，and stabbed their country to the heart.An ordinance of the Cortes had been made about an hundred years before，against increasing the standing forces of the kingdom to more than four thousand soldiers in garrisons，and fifteen hundred ginets.This ordinance had not been very well observed.The long wars with the Moors made armies often necessary when there was no actual war.The danger of being invaded by the Moors，for every Moorish king was deemed a pretender to the throne，might serve to make them so represented；and when this reason failed entirely，as it did by the conquest of Granada，the last possession of these people in Spain，pretences for keeping armies on foot were still to be found.
There were still Moorish factions；the new Christians were Moors in their hearts；amongst the old Christians there were several who favoured them；the people were not to be trusted with their own preservation.Chiévres，the rapacious minister of Charles the Fifth，and his journeymen，for so were those Spaniards called，according to Dr Geddes，who did not care how much their country was plundered by foreigners，provided they shared the spoils；Chiévres，I say，and his journeymen，a real faction，and perhaps not a great one，were the last friends of the government.The rest of the nation were open or secret enemies.According to this excellent logic，the former were to be protected in blundering，for they were guilty of that too，as well as in plundering；and the latter were to be oppressed for complaining.
